How Iran views the Turkish invasion of northern Syria

One expert sees Iran’s policy as dual containment and debilitation of Syrian Kurds and Ankara-backed rebels at the same time

By MIDDLE EAST EYE / Maysam Behravesh

Like most Arab and European governments, Iran has condemned Turkey’s military offensive against Kurdish militia groups in northeastern Syria, which started shortly after US President Donald Trump abruptly ordered the withdrawal of American forces stationed along the border following a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Ahmed Aboul Gheit, secretary general of the Arab League – a regional organisation of 22 Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa – described the incursion as “a blatant violation of Syria’s sovereignty” that “could allow for the revival” of the Islamic State (IS) group. It has called for a crisis meeting on Saturday to discuss its consequences. In a similar vein, the European Union has strongly criticized the invasion, with EU high representative for foreign policy Federica Mogherini warning that the invasion risked “protracted instability in northeast Syria, providing fertile ground for the resurgence” of IS. Some European governments have also threatened sanctions and an arms embargo against Ankara.

Iran, Turkey’s close trading partner and neighbour to the northwest, has joined the chorus, but the stakes for it are fundamentally different. This helps explain why the Islamic Republic has not moved beyond verbal-only criticism and has refrained, say, from deploying paramilitary forces under its command to defend Syrian sovereignty and Kurdish-held territories.

Iran’s verbal denunciation

Iran’s verbal denunciation In a statement on 10 October, the Iranian foreign ministry expressed “concern” over Turkey’s military operation and demanded “an immediate stop to the attacks and the exit of the Turkish military from Syrian territory.” Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had earlier flagged up a 1998 security pact signed between Turkey and Syria – commonly known as the Adana agreement – as a sound legal framework for establishing security on the Turkish-Syrian border in a peaceful way. According to the accord, then Syrian president Hafez al-Assad pledged to shut down the bases of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara regards a terrorist group, in Syria and expel its leader Abdullah Ocalan from the country.

• Kurdish rebels deny claim that Turkey has taken control of Syrian town Ras al-Ain
• Read More »

“The Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria—still valid—can be the better path to achieve security. Iran can help bring together the Syrian Kurds, the Syrian Govt., and Turkey so that the Syrian Army together with Turkey can guard the border,” Zarif tweeted, summing up his suggestions in an interview with Ankara’s state-run news channel TRT World.

As the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, dubbed Operation Peace Spring, entered its third day on 11 October, Iranian hard-liners voiced a relatively hardened stance against it. Tehran’s Provisional Friday Prayers Leader Ahmad Khatami highlighted the Saudi plight in Yemen on Friday, warning Ankara not to fall in a similar “trap” and create “a new quagmire” for itself.

“This military action will fail to achieve Turkey’s objectives while stoking Kurdish nationalism and probably prompting them to reach a reconciliation with Damascus,” Diako Hosseini, director of the World Studies Programme at Iran’s presidential Center for Strategic Studies, told MEE. “It might also lead to a long war of attrition and drag Turkey further into the predicament in northern Syria.”

Blessing in disguise

This does not, however, mean that Iran sees no silver lining in the development. While officially expressing opposition to Ankara’s explicit violation of Syrian sovereignty, the Iranian leadership seems to treat it as a blessing in disguise for a number of reasons, otherwise it could have mobilised a fighting force of Shia paramilitaries to defend the north against Turkish incursion.

First of all, despite emphasising the need for a peaceful resolution of tensions between Turkey and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Tehran might calculate that even if Turkey wins the battle, it would ultimately be easier to expel Ankara-allied Syrian militants – some of whom have close ties with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates – than US-backed Kurds who enjoy the political support of Western powers, from the area.

Given the likelihood that neither Tehran nor Damascus will finally accommodate the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish enclave, let alone an independent state, in northeast Syria, it would serve them well to let Turkey do the dirty work and then take action against it as “liberators” of Syrian lands from foreign “occupiers”.

• Death toll mounts as thousands flee Turkish bombardment in Syria
• Read More »

Russia, the Assad government’s most influential powerbroker, is likely to tag along – considering its grave concerns about terrorist entrenchment in Syria – as it has joined forces with the Syrian army to drive out militants from Idlib in the northwest despite a “demilitarization” agreement with Turkey within the Astana peace framework.

Still, such a scenario can be more difficult for Damascus and its Iranian and Russian allies to implement if a triumphant Turkey manages to populate areas currently held by Kurds with millions of Syrian refugees and impose a new demographic order on the ground.

Secondly, the Islamic Republic and the Assad government are deeply wary of Rojava’s progressive model of governance that is based on “democratic confederalism” and has served as a source of inspiration for other Kurdish minorities in the region to seek autonomy and independence. After all, it was this “gender-egalitarian and eco-protective” governance that galvanized Iraqi Kurds in September 2017 to hold an independence referendum in the face of opposition from the central government in Baghdad, which ultimately thwarted their aspirations with massive Iranian assistance.

Tehran clearly does not want Syrian Kurds to act as a role model for its restive Kurdish population along the border with Iraq. Not surprisingly, the Iranian Army held unannounced military drills near the border with Turkey on 9 October, the same day Ankara launched its incursion into northeast Syria.

“Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has common with Turkey in undermining Kurds and precluding their independence on the one hand, while it is also concerned about the empowerment of Turkey-allied Syrian rebels and how they might weaken the Assad rule,” Saeid Golkar, an IRGC expert at the University of Tennessee and author of Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran, told MEE.

“While Tehran is obviously very happy with the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Syria, IRGC’s policy is dual containment and debilitation of Syrian Kurds and Ankara-backed rebels at the same time.”

• ‘Agents of Washington’: Damascus rejects dialogue with Kurdish-led SDF
• Read More »

Finally, the SDF – of which People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a core part – appears to have formed close relations with Israel, Iran’s regional arch-foe, over the past years. There have been intelligence reports that a series of Israeli drone and missile strikes against Tehran-allied Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) positions in Iraq were launched from Kurdish-held territories in northeastern Syria.

This provides further motivation for the Islamic Republic to hold Shia militia forces back and let its Turkish and Kurdish rivals in Syria bleed each other as dry as possible. Given the Erdogan government’s tense ties with Israel, the Iranian leadership can at least rest assured that northeast Syria will not turn into a “launch pad” for Israel to stage attacks against Iranian installations and interests across the region, if Turkey succeeds in expelling Kurdish militias from the area.

All told, a prolonged Turkish invasion is likely to widen differences between Ankara on the one hand and Tehran and Moscow on the other and persuade Assad’s two main allies to step in more forcefully.

“Iran and Russia are both averse to showing Turkey a harsh response, but if it does not end its military offensive in Syria soon, they might decide to apply more pressure on Ankara, which, coupled with growing international pressure, could complicate the situation for Edgogan,” Hosseini of Iran’s presidential Center for Strategic Studies concluded.